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The literature on foreign direct investment has analyzed firms’ location decisions when they invest in R&D 
to reduce production costs. Such firms may set up new plants in other developed countries while maintaining 
their domestic plants. In contrast, here we consider firms that close down their domestic operations and relocate 
to countries where wage costs are lower. Thus, we assume that firms may reduce their production costs by 
investing in R&D and also by moving their plants abroad. We show that these two mechanisms are 
complementary. When a firm relocates it invests more in R&D than when it does not change its location and, 
therefore, its production cost is lower in the first case. As a result, investment in R&D encourages firms to 
relocate. When firms do not invest in R&D on relocation, R&D discourages firms to relocate since the investment 
made by the firms that remain in the country partially offsets the labor cost advantage obtained by the firms that 
move their plants abroad.  
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  1Introduction 
 
The relocation of firms, which affects market structure in advanced countries, is a matter 
of current interest given the liberalization currently under way in world trade. The 
literature studying the location decisions of firms has mainly analyzed the different factors 
that influence such decisions, e.g. reducing wage costs, entering foreign markets and 
establishing cooperation agreements between firms, and how governments can influence 
them (see, e.g. Mucchielli and Saucier, 1997; Feenstra, 1999; Blomstöm and Kokko, 2003; 
Fumagalli 2003; Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2003). These studies have been extended to 
analyze whether the relocation of firms is harmful to the countries out of which they move 
because of the resulting loss of employment when the labor force is unionized (see, e. g. 
Leahy and Montagna, 2000; Lommerud et al., 2003; Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2009). 
However, these papers do not take into account that when firms move to new locations 
abroad, their established knowledge may need to be adapted to the circumstances 
prevailing there, and this may justify some investment in R&D (European Commission, 
2010). 
 
Empirical evidence shows that R&D investment is an important factor that affects 
firms’ locations (see European Commission, 2010). However, papers analyzing R&D 
competition and the importance of the transfer of technological knowledge between firms 
usually consider oligopolistic firms producing within a single country and, therefore, 
ignore firms’ location decisions.
1 Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) extend the above 
studies by considering a two-developed-country model with one firm located in each 
country, in which the firms can expand abroad by exporting or by building a new plant in 
the foreign developed country (foreign direct investment, FDI). They show that investment 
in R&D encourages the firms to expand abroad via FDI rather than via exports.
2 Norbäck 
(2001) analyzes the same issue but considers a single firm that produces a good whose 
demand is located in another country. The firm decides its technology, which can be 
implemented at home without cost or abroad with a transfer cost (since it must be adapted to 
                                                 
1 See, e. g. d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992) and Petit and Tolwinski (1998). 
2 Gerbasch and Schmutzler (2011) jointly analyze the foreign entry decisions and R&D location decisions 
made by two firms based in different countries. They show that liberalization of FDI may cause a relocation 
of R&D activities. 
  2local conditions). He shows that if technology transfer costs are low (high), R&D intensive 
firms decide to use this technology in an affiliate (domestic plant) which supplies the market 
from a foreign plant (by exporting its production).
3
 
Although there are various factors that lead firms to change the location of their 
production plants, this paper focuses on relocations that seek to reduce labor costs (in order 
to be competitive in the home market) since there is currently more and more empirical 
evidence that shows that firms are deciding to move to countries where wage costs are 
lower.4 In advanced countries, the labor market is characterized by high levels of 
unionization, whereas in less advanced countries there is little or no trade union presence or 
wage bargaining, so labor costs are lower.
5 The objective of this paper is to analyze firms’ 
decisions as to whether to relocate to a country with lower labor costs when they invest at the 
same time in R&D to reduce the marginal cost of production. Thus, we consider two ways of 
reducing production costs: by investing in R&D and by relocating the firm.  
 
Our paper differs from that of Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000) and Norbäck (2001) in 
several points. First, their papers do not analyze whether R&D encourages FDI; they 
compare FDI and exports assuming that firms always invest in R&D. In contrast, we analyze 
whether R&D encourages relocation by comparing the case in which firms invest in R&D 
with that in which firms do not do so. Second, their papers focus their analysis on the study 
of how firms can enter new markets, while we study how firms can be competitive in their 
home markets. Finally, we consider two ways of reducing marginal production cost: the 
                                                 
3 There are other related papers that focus only on one of these two factors: location decisions (Siotis, 1999; 
Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006) or R&D decisions (Belderbos et al., 2008). 
4
 For example, the European textile sector is closing factories in Europe to relocate to countries with lower 
wages due to the total liberalization of textile trade that took place in 2005. Similarly, in the automotive 
industry, some firms are relocating their production plants to the Eastern Europe, Brazil or China, where the 
labor costs are lower [El País, 29/9/2004].  
5 The literature on wage bargaining has analyzed how the structure in which workers are organized to bargain 
wages affects R&D investment  by firms that increases the productivity of labor (see, e.g. Tauman and Weiss, 
1987; Ulph and Ulph, 1998; Calabuig and González-Maestre, 2002; Bárcena-Ruiz and Campo, 2009). 
However, these papers do not analyze firms’ decisions as to whether to relocate to countries where wage costs 
are lower. 
  3marginal cost of labor can be reduced by relocating the firm and the marginal cost of capital 
can be reduced by investing in R&D; in contrast, they consider only the second mechanism. 
 
An example than illustrates the problem analyzed in the paper is given by the Renault–
Nissan Alliance, signed on March 1999. Many automobile manufacturers are relocating their 
productive plants to countries with lower labor costs to guarantee their survival. In this 
regard, Renault decided to close its plant at Vilvoorde (Belgium) in 1997. In March 2007 the 
alliance decided to build an automobile manufacturing plant in southern India. India is now 
not only the production hub for compact cars for Japanese auto giant Nissan Motor 
Company: it is also going to be the company’s R&D hub.
6 Another example is given by the 
Finnish firm Nokia, which opened its first plant in Beijing (China) in 1985. By the turn of the 
century China was Nokia’s main production center worldwide. Nokia has opened two world-
wide R&D centers in China, has many offices in different regions of the country, and has 
moved there the production process for all of its products there (see www.nokia.com/press).
7
 
In order to analyze the issue proposed in the paper, we consider an advanced economy 
made up of two firms that produce a homogeneous good by using labor and capital as 
production factors. All workers are unionized and there is an independent union at each 
firm. In order to determine the wage set at each firm, we consider the monopoly-union 
model (see Booth, 1995) in which the wage is set by the unions and firms then choose the 
employment level. The marginal production cost comprises the marginal cost of capital and 
the marginal cost of labor (the wage). We assume that the marginal cost of capital can be 
reduced by investing in R&D and that the marginal cost of labor can be reduced by 
relocating the firm to a country with non-unionized workers.
8 When a firm relocates it 
                                                 
6 See www.thehindubusinessline.com/2010/01/19/stories/2010011951230200.htm and www.renault.com. 
7 Similarly, Microsoft entered the Chinese market in 1992 and since then has invested a great deal of money 
to build its R&D Center, the Investment Institute in Asia and the World-wide Technology Centre. Microsoft 
moved production of its Xbox to China and now produces computer mouses in Guangdong (see 
www.microsoft.com/presspass).  
8 It could be assumed that each firm invests in R&D which increases the marginal productivity of labor rather 
than reducing the marginal cost of capital. It can be proved that the same result is obtained in both cases. 
This is because when a firm invests in R&D that increases the marginal productivity of labor, it reduces the 
marginal cost of capital.  
  4closes its domestic production plant and sets up a new one in a country where wage costs 
are lower. Firms have to pay a fixed cost to relocate their production plants.  
 
We consider first that firms may invest in R&D independently of their location. We 
show that when a firm relocates, it invests more in R&D than when it remains in its home 
country. This means that the two mechanisms (relocation firm and investment in R&D) to 
reduce marginal production costs are complementary. When a firm moves to a country 
where wage costs are lower, its market share and profits increase, which permits it to 
invest more in R&D, and thus to gain additional market share at the expense of its rival. 
Therefore, the former (latter) firm makes the higher (lower) investment in R&D. Given 
that the marginal cost of capital depends on the investment in R&D of the firms, when a 
firm relocates not only its marginal cost of labor is lower but also its marginal cost of 
capital is lower.  
 
In order to analyze whether R&D investment affects firms’ relocation decisions, we 
consider the case in which firms do not invest in R&D as a benchmark case. We obtain 
that the range of values of parameters in which at least one firm relocates is wider when 
firms invest in R&D than in the benchmark case. Therefore, investment in R&D by firms 
encourages relocation. The reason is that investment in R&D is greater in case of relocation 
than when firms remain in their home countries. This implies that when a firm relocates both 
the marginal cost of capital and the marginal cost of labor are lower, which means that profits 
are higher.  
 
It also can be considered that when a firm relocates it seeks to reduce labor costs and does 
not invest in R&D (since, for example, firms might employ mainly low-skill workers). 
However, the firms that remain in the home country invest in R&D to be able to compete 
with the firms that move abroad. In this case, it is obtained that the range of values of 
parameters in which at least one firm relocates is smaller than in the benchmark case. This is 
because the investment made by the firms that remain in the home country partially offsets 
the cost advantage obtained by the firms that move their production plants abroad, so the 
incentive to relocate is weaker than in the benchmark case. As a result, when firms invest 
  5in R&D independently of their location, the range of values of parameters in which at least 
one firm relocates is greater than when firms do not invest in R&D on relocation.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 sets out the model. In Section 3 
we consider, as a benchmark case, that firms do not invest in R&D. Section 4 shows the 
results of the model when firms invest in R&D independently of their locations while 
Section 5 analyzes the case in which firms do not invest in R&D if they relocate. Finally, 
Section 6 offers conclusions. 
 
2. The model 
 
We consider an advanced economy made up of two firms, A and B, producing a 
homogeneous good.  The industry inverse demand function for the product is:  
 
p = a – qA – qB,                              (1) 
 
where p is the price of the good and qi is the amount of the good produced by firm i, i= A, B. 
 
In order to produce the good firm i uses as production factors labor, Li, and capital 
(machines or non labor factors), Ki, according to the following production technology: 
 
     q i = { } i i K L Min , , i= A, B. 
 
Firm i hires Li workers with a uniform wage rate wi, i=A, B. All workers are unionized 




Ui(wi, Li) = wi Li, i=A, B.      ( 2 )  
 
  Unions and firms are both risk neutral. Unions have the objective of income 
maximization. In order to determine the wage set at each firm, we consider the monopoly-
  6union model (see Booth, 1995). This model assumes that the unions set the wage and the 
firms then choose the employment level. 
 
Thus, the cost function of firm i is given by: 
 
   C (qi, wi, xi) = wi qi + (c – β xi) qi, i=A, B.                                         (3) 
 
The marginal production cost comprises the marginal cost of labor, wi, and the marginal 
cost of capital (when there is no R&D), which is constant and is denoted by c.
9 Equation 
(3) shows that the marginal cost of labor can be reduced by relocating the firm, and the 
marginal cost of capital can be reduced by investing in R&D. When a firm relocates it closes 
its domestic production plant and sets up a new one in a foreign country where wage costs 
are lower because workers are not unionized. The output of this firm is exported to the 
advanced country (we thus assume that there is only one market for the good). In order to 
simplify the analysis, and with no loss of generality, we assume that the wage paid in the 
foreign country is the reservation wage, which is normalized to zero. Firm i invests amount 
xi in R&D, which lowers its marginal cost of capital: c – β xi. Parameter β determines the 
rate at which marginal cost of capital, c, declines with an increase in R&D. It shows the 
productivity of the firm’s research effort. 
 
We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that there are no R&D externalities. The cost of 
R&D is assumed to be quadratic, reflecting the existence of diminishing returns to R&D 
expenditures (see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). Specifically, the cost of R&D of 






2, γ > γ , i=A, B,       ( 4 )  
 
                                                 
9 We assume that a>3c to simplify the exposition of the results of the model when comparing results 
obtained in different cases. This assumption does not alter the main results of the paper. If parameter a is 
interpreted as the size of the market, this restriction implies that the size of the market has to be high enough. 
  7where γ = ) 144 /( ) 900 588 1225 30 35 (
2 2 2 c c ac a c a + − + + β .
10 Parameter γ is related to the 
firm’s cost effectiveness in R&D technology, so that a low value of the parameter indicates 
greater efficiency in R&D technology. 
 
When firm i relocates closes its domestic production plant and sets up a new one in a 
foreign country it has to pay a fixed cost Fi to relocate the plant (i=A, B). Thus, the profit of 
firm i can be expressed as: 
 




2 – Fi, i≠j; i, j=A, B,      (5) 
 
where, Fi=F and wi=0 if firm i relocates, and Fi=0 and wi>0 if firm i remains in its home 
country. 
 
The objective of this paper is to study firms’ decisions as to whether to relocate when 
they invest in R&D to reduce the marginal cost of capital. We consider two cases: (i) firms 
invest in R&D if they relocate and (ii) firms do not invest in R&D if they relocate. We 
propose a four stage game with the following timing. In the first stage, firms decide 
simultaneously whether to relocate. In the second stage, firms decide simultaneously their 
investments in R&D (if any). In the third stage, unions set wages simultaneously. Finally, 
in the fourth stage, firms make quantity decisions and hire labor. We solve the game by 
backward induction from the last stage of the game to obtain a subgame perfect Nash 
Equilibrium. 
 
We consider first, as a benchmark case, that firms do not invest in R&D independently 
of their locations. 
 
3. Benchmark case  
 
                                                 
10 Condition γ>γ assures that the marginal cost of capital of the firms is positive in all cases (c - βxi>0), and 
that second order conditions hold. 
  8In this case, as firms do not invest in R&D, there are only three stages. In the first stage, 
firms decide simultaneously whether to relocate. In the second stage, unions set wages 
simultaneously. Finally, in the third stage, firms make quantity decisions and hire labor. 
 
There are three subgames to be analyzed: neither firm relocates (denoted by NN), only 
one firm relocates (the superscript RN denotes the firm that relocates while NR denotes the 
firm that remains in the home country) and, finally, both firms relocate (denoted by RR).  
 
Next we solve the second and third stages of the game when neither firm relocates. In 
the third stage, firm i chooses the output level that maximizes its profits, given by 
expression (5), for Fi=0 and xi=0,  i=A, B. Solving this, the equilibrium output (and 
employment) levels as a function of wage rates are obtained: 
 
qi(wi, wj) = Li(wi, wj) =
3
2 j i w w c a + − −
,  i≠j; i, j=A, B.                                   (6) 
 
In the second stage, unions simultaneously choose the wage that maximizes their utility 
functions: 
 
wi(wj) = arg max wi Li(wi, wj), i≠j; i, j=A, B,         (7) 
                    wi 
 
















We now consider that firm j relocates while firm i remains in the country; thus, Fj=F, 
wj=0 and Fi=0. In the third stage, each firm chooses the output level that maximizes its 
profit, given by expression (5), where xi=xj=0. Solving this, the equilibrium output (and 
employment) levels as a function of wi are obtained: 
 
  9qi(wi) = Li(wi) = 
3
2 i w c a − −
, qj(wi) = Lj(wi) = 
3
i w c a + −
, i≠j; i, j=A ,B.       (8)  
 
In the second stage, the union of firm i chooses the wage that maximizes its utility 
function: 
 
wi = arg max wi Li(wi), i≠j; i, j=A, B,         (9) 
                wi 
 





, wRN = 0, qNR




 = LRN = 
12















Finally, we consider that both firms relocate. In the third stage, each firm chooses the 
output level that maximizes its profit, given by expression (5), where Fj=Fi=F, wj=wi=0 
and xj=xi=0. Solving this, the following is obtained:  
 
wRR = 0, qRR
 = LRR = 
3
c a−










Let F1B denote the value of parameter F such that   if and only if F≤F1B, and 
F2B denote the value of parameter F such that   if and only if F≤F2B, where 
F2B>F1B.
NR RR π π ≥
NN RN π π ≥
11 Finally, we solve the first stage of the game, obtaining the following result. 
 
Proposition 1. When the firms do not invest in R&D both firms relocate if F≤F1B, only one 
firm relocates if F2B>F>F1B, and neither firm relocates if F≥F2B.  
 
Proof. See appendix 
                                                 
11 The values of parameters F1B and F2B are relegated to the appendix. 
  10 
Given that the firms do not invest in R&D, the result shown in Proposition 1 is due only 
to the effects that arise when firms relocate: the relocation of a firm decreases its marginal 
cost of labor but its marginal cost of capital (c) remains unchanged. We next analyze these 
effects. 
 
It is easy to see that wNN>wNR>wRN=wRR=0 and qRN>qRR>qNN>qNR. If a firm relocates, its 
wage costs decrease (wRN=wRR=0), and it gains market share at the expense of the firm that 
remains in the home country. The former firm produces more and the latter firm less. 
When both firms relocate their output level is greater than if neither firm relocates since 
production costs are lower in the first case. As a result, if changing the location of the firm 
does not require any investment (i.e., F=0), then πRN > πRR > πNN > πNR. This reflects the 
positive incentive to relocate the firm. This incentive is larger if the other firm does not 
change its location. But, as setting up a new firm requires an investment (F>0), different 
investment levels will produce different results in equilibrium. In fact, if F is low enough 
(F≤F1B) both firms find it profitable to relocate. For intermediate values of F (F2B>F>F1B) 
only one firm relocates. In that case, if both firms change their locations the increase in 
their profits is not large enough to offset the cost of relocation. However, if only one firm 
relocates the increase in its profit at the expense of its rival offsets the cost of relocation. 
Finally, if F is high enough (F≥F2B) neither firm relocates since the increase in its profit 
does not offset the cost of relocation.  
 
4. The firms invest in R&D independently of their locations 
 
In this section we consider that the firms invest in R&D to reduce the marginal cost of 
capital independently of their locations. Thus, a four stage game must be solved. As in the 
above section three subgames must be analyzed: neither firm relocates, only one firm 
relocates and, finally, both firms relocate. We consider first that neither firm relocates. 
 
4.1. Neither firm relocates 
 
  11We first solve the fourth stage of the game, obtaining the equilibrium in the product 
market. In this stage, firm i chooses the output level that maximizes its profits, given by 
expression (5), for Fi=0. Solving this, we obtain the equilibrium output and employment 
levels as a function of wage rates and R&D investments: 
 
qi(wi(xi, xj), wj(xi, xj), xi, xj) =  ) 2 2 (
3
1
j i j i x x w w c a β β − + + − − , i≠j; i, j=A, B.       (10) 
 
In the third stage, unions simultaneously choose the wage that maximizes their utility 
functions: 
 
wi(wj(xi, xj), xi, xj) = arg max wi(xi, xj) Li(wi (xi, xj), wj(xi, xj), xi, xj), i≠j; i, j=A, B,   (11) 
                      wi 
 
where Li(wi(xi, xj), wj(xi, xj), xi, xj)=qi(wi(xi, xj), wj(xi, xj), xi, xj) is given by expression (10). 
Solving this, we obtain the wage of the firms, as a function of R&D investments: 
 
wi (xi, xj) =  ) 2 7 ) ( 5 (
15
1
j i x x c a β β − + − , i≠j; i, j=A, B.              (12) 
 
It can be shown from equation (12) that the wage paid by firm i decreases with the rival’s 
level of R&D ( ), since it reduces the output level and profits of firm i, which 
means that firm i pays a lower wage. In contrast, the wage paid by firm i increases with its 
own investment in R&D ( ) since it decreases the marginal cost of capital and, 
thus, increases its market share and profits, which means that it pays a higher wage. 
0 / < ∂ ∂ j i x w
0 / > ∂ ∂ i i x w
 
In the second stage, firm i (i=A, B) chooses the R&D investment, xi, that maximizes its 
profit. Solving this, we obtain the following result. 
 
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, when neither firm relocates:  
xNN












, LNN = qNN







  12 πNN = 2 2
2 2
) 56 405 (







We now consider that only one firm relocates.  
 
4.2. Only one firm relocates 
 
We now assume that firm j relocates while firm i remains in the home country. Thus, in 
the fourth stage, each firm chooses the output level that maximizes its profit, given by 
expression (5), where Fj=F, wj=0 and Fi=0. Solving this, we obtain the equilibrium output 
and employment levels as a function of wage rates and R&D investments: 
 
qj(wi(xi, xj), xi, xj) = Lj(wi(xi, xj), xi, xj) =   ) 2 (
3
1
i j i x x w c a β β − + + − , 
(13) 
qi(wi(xi, xj), xi, xj) = Li(wi(xi, xj), xi, xj) =  ) 2 2 (
3
1
i j i x x w c a β β + − − − , i≠j; i,j=A,B. 
 
In the third stage, the union of firm i chooses the wage that maximizes its utility 
function: 
 
wi(xi, xj) = arg max wi(xi, xj) Li(wi(xi, xj), xi, xj), i≠j; i, j=A, B.                 (14) 
             wi 
 
Solving this, we obtain the wage paid by firm i as a function of R&D investments: 
 
wi(xi, xj) =  ) 2 (
4
1
i j x x c a β β + − − , i≠j; i, j=A, B.      (15) 
 
In the second stage, firms simultaneously choose the R&D investment that maximizes 
their profits. Solving this, we obtain the following result. 
 
  13Lemma 2. In equilibrium, when only one firm relocates:  
xNR
 = 4 2 2
2
28 195 216






 = 4 2 2
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wNR =  4 2 2
2
28 195 216





, qRN= LNR= 4 2 2
2
28 195 216






qNR= LRN= 4 2 2
2
28 195 216





, πNR= 2 4 2 2
2 2 2 2
) 28 195 216 (
) 7 6 )( 2 9 ( ) ( 4
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) 28 195 216 ( 2
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β γβ γ
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. 
 
  Finally, we consider that both firms change their locations.  
 
4.3. Both firms relocate 
 
In the fourth stage of the game, each firm chooses the output level that maximizes its 
profit, given by expression (5), where Fj=Fi=F and wj=wi=0. Solving this, we obtain the 
equilibrium output and employment levels as a function of wage rates and R&D 
investments: 
 
qi(xi, xj)= Li(xi, xj)= ) 2 (
3
1
j i x x c a β β − + −  , i≠j; i, j=A, B.     (16) 
 
In this case there is no third stage since the wage is exogenously given. In the second 
stage, the firms simultaneously choose R&D investments that maximize their profits. 
Solving this, we obtain the following result. 
 
Lemma 3. In equilibrium, when both firms relocate:  
xRR



















) 4 9 (





Next we compare the results obtained in the three cases considered. 
 
  144.4. Comparison of  the three cases 
 
Comparing the results obtained in Lemmas 1 to 3 we obtain the following result. 
 
Proposition 2. When firms invest in R&D when they relocate, in equilibrium:  
i) xRN > xRR > xNN > xNR;  
ii) wNN > wNR > wRN = wRR = 0, qRN > qRR > qNN > qNR. 
 
Proof. See Appendix 
 
This proposition shows that when a firm relocates, independently of whether its rival 
decides to relocate or not, it invests more in R&D than when it remains in the home country. 
When only one firm relocates its marginal cost of labor decreases and thus its market share 
and profits increase, which enables it to make invest more in R&D and gain additional 
market share at the expense of its rival since its marginal cost of capital decreases. Therefore, 
the former (latter) firm makes the higher (lower) investment in R&D. As a result, when a 
firm relocates it reduces its marginal cost of labor, which implies more investment in R&D 
and thus marginal production costs are additionally reduced. 
 
As seen above, the wage of firm i decreases with the rival’s level of R&D ( 0 / < ∂ ∂ j i x w ) 
and increases with its own investment in R&D ( 0 / > ∂ ∂ i i x w ). Thus, as xNN>xNR it is obtained 
that wNN>wNR>0. Finally, given that firms that relocate pay lower wages and invest more in 
R&D they produce more (qRN > qRR > qNN > qNR).  
 
It remains to solve the first stage of the game, in which firms decide whether to relocate 
or not. 
 
  154.5. Firms decide whether to relocate 
 
Let F1 denote the value of parameter F such that πNR≥πRR if and only if F≥F1, and F2 
denote the value of parameter F such that πRN≥πNN if and only if F≤F2, where F2>F1.
12 
Solving the first stage of the game, the following result is obtained. 
 
Proposition 3. When firms invest in R&D when they relocate: both firms relocate if F≤F1, 
only one firm relocates if F1<F<F2 and, neither firm relocates if F≥F2.  
 
Proof. See Appendix 
 
It is immediately apparent that if relocating the firm entails no cost (i.e. if F=0), it is 
obtained that πRN>πRR>πNN>πNR. If F=0, when firm i relocates, it reduces its marginal cost 
of labor (wi=0) since there is no wage bargaining in the new location. Additionally, when 
firm i relocates it invests more in R&D, which reduces the marginal cost of capital. This 
last effect reinforces the first one and, as a result, the total marginal production cost of the 
firm that relocates decreases. This has a stronger effect on profits than the greater 
expenditure in R&D. As a result, when a firm relocates (independently of the decision 
made by its rival) it obtains higher profits. Therefore, if relocating a firm does not entail 
any cost (F=0), both firms have a positive incentive to relocate and, thus, in equilibrium 
they both do so.  
 
When relocating entails a positive cost (F>0) a negative effect appears that reduces the 
incentive of firms to relocate. In fact, when the fixed cost, F, is low enough (F≤F1) the 
positive incentive to relocate is stronger than the negative one in both firms and, thus, both 
firms change their locations. When F is high enough (F≥F2) neither firm relocates since 
the negative incentive to relocate is stronger than the positive one in both firms. Finally, 
for intermediate values of F (F1<F<F2), if only one firm relocates that firm gains market 
share and profits at the expense of its rival, which makes the positive effect large enough 
                                                 
12 The values of parameters F1 and F2 are relegated to the appendix. 
  16to offset the negative one in the firm that relocates. As a result, only one firm changes 
relocates. 
 
  Next we compare the results obtained in Propositions 1 and 3 to study whether investment 
in R&D by firms encourages relocation or not.  
 
Proposition 4. When firms invest in R&D independently of their location, the range of 
value of parameters for which at least one firm relocates is wider than in the benchmark 
case. 
 
Proof. See Appendix 
 
This proposition shows (see Figure 1) that investment in R&D by firms encourages 
relocation. Proposition 2 shows that investment in R&D is greater in case of relocation than 
when the firms remain in the home country. This implies that when a firm relocates both the 
marginal cost of capital and the marginal cost of labor are lower, which means that profits are 
higher. As a result, when firms invest in R&D they relocate for a wider range of parameter 
values than in the benchmark case.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
When F1B<F≤F1 only one firm relocates in the benchmark case while both firms do so 
when firms invest in R&D. In the benchmark case, if both firms relocate the increase in 
their profits due to the lower marginal cost of labor is not large enough to offset the cost of 
relocation. However, when firms invest in R&D the lower marginal cost of capital 
combined with the lower marginal cost of labor in case of relocation generates an increase 
in their profits that offsets the cost of relocation. When F2B<F≤F2 neither firm relocates in 
the benchmark case since the increase in their profits does not offset the fixed cost F. 
However, when firms invest in R&D if one firm does not relocate the other one does, since 
the latter firm makes a greater investment in R&D, which decreases its marginal cost of 
capital and increases its profits on the benchmark case. Thus, if only one firm relocates it 
gains market share and profits at the expense of its rival, which offsets the fixed cost that it 
  17has to pay. Finally, for the remaining parameter values the two firms make the same 
relocation decision in both cases. 
 
5. Only firms that do not relocate invest in R&D 
 
We now consider that firms invest in R&D only if they do not relocate their production 
plants. Thus, investment in R&D is a way of avoiding a loss of competitiveness regarding 
firms that relocate. We have to analyze three subgames: neither firm relocates, only one 
firm relocates, and both firms relocate. Solving these subgames and comparing them (see 
Appendix), we obtain the following result. 
 
Proposition 5. When firms do not invest in R&D when they relocate, in equilibrium:  
i) xNN > xNR >xRN = xRR=0; 
ii) wNN > wNR > wRN = wRR = 0, qRN > qRR > qNN > qNR. 
 
Proof. See Appendix 
 
This proposition shows that a firm invests more in R&D if its rival remains in the home 
country than if it relocates (xNN>xNR). When only one firm relocates, its marginal cost of 
labor decreases and, thus, the firm that remains in the home country loses market share and 
profits at the expense of its rival. As a result, the firm that does not relocate invests less in 
R&D than if its rival remains in the home country. Given that the wage of firm i increases 
with its own investment in R&D, when a firm does not relocate it pays higher wages when 
its rival remains in the home country than when its rival relocates (wNN>wNR).  When only 
one firm relocates its marginal labor cost decreases, which has a greater effect than the 
reduction in the marginal cost of production of the firm that remains in the home country. 
Thus, the firm that relocates gains market share and profits at the expense of its rival. 
Therefore: qRN > qRR > qNN > qNR.  
 
It remains to solve the first stage of the game. In that stage, firms decide whether to 
relocate or not. Solving the first stage we obtain the following result. 
 
  18Proposition 6. When firms do not invest in R&D when they relocate: both firms relocate if 
F≤F1N, only one firm relocates if F1N<F<F2N, and neither firm relocates if F≥F2N.
13  
 
Proof. See Appendix 
 
There is a positive incentive for a firm to relocate: its marginal cost of labor and, 
therefore, its marginal production cost decreases since there is no wage bargaining. 
However, as firms have to pay the cost of setting up a new firm, there is a negative effect. 
In this case only firms that remain in the home country invest in R&D, which reduces the 
production cost of the firms that do not relocate. This is also a negative incentive to 
relocate. 
 
When the fixed cost, F, is low enough (F≤F1N) the positive incentive to relocate is 
stronger than the negative ones in both firms and, thus, both firms relocate. When F is high 
enough (F≥F2N) neither firm relocates since the negative incentives to relocate are stronger 
than the positive one in both firms. Finally, for intermediate values of F (F1N<F<F2N), if 
only one firm relocates that firm gains market share and profits at the expense of its rival, 
which makes the positive effect large enough to offset the negative ones in the firm that 
relocates. As a result, only one firm relocates.  
 
  Next we compare the results obtained in Proposition 1 and 6 to study whether the 
investment in R&D by firms encourages relocation or not. This result is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
 
Proposition 7. When only firms that do not relocate invest in R&D, the range of values of 
parameters for which at least one firm relocates is narrower than in the benchmark case. 
 
Proof. See Appendix 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
                                                 
13 The values of parameters F1N and F2N are relegated to the appendix. 
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This proposition shows (see Figure 2) that as firms that do not relocate may invest in 
R&D to increase their competitiveness, the incentive to relocate is weaker than in the 
benchmark case. This implies that firms that do not relocate have a lower marginal cost of 
capital than those that do; however, the marginal cost of labor is greater. As a result, firms 
relocate for a narrower range of parameter values than in the benchmark case.  
 
When F1N<F≤F1B both firms relocate in the benchmark case while only one firm does 
do when domestic firms invest in R&D. In the benchmark case, if both firms relocate the 
increase in their profits is large enough to offset the cost of relocation. However, when 
domestic firms invest in R&D the lower marginal cost of capital generates an increase in 
their profits that offsets the cost of relocation for only one firm. When F2N<F≤F2B only one 
firm relocates in the benchmark case since the increase in the profits of the firms offsets 
the fixed cost F only for one firm. When domestic firms invest in R&D neither of them 
relocates. Finally, for the remaining parameter values the two firms make the same 




The literature studying the location decisions of firms does not take into account that when 
firms move to new locations abroad their established knowledge may need to be adapted to 
the circumstances prevailing there, which may justify investment in R&D.  
 
The literature on foreign direct investments (FDI) has considered firms’ location 
decisions and firms’ R&D investment decisions endogenously and simultaneously, 
showing that investment in R&D encourages firms to expand abroad via FDI instead of via 
exports. However, this literature assumes that firms maintain their domestic plants. There 
is empirical evidence to indicate that many firms are closing their plants in advanced 
countries to relocate in countries with lower wage costs. We therefore study how firms’ 
decisions as to whether to relocate to a country with non-unionized workers and, thus, with 
a lower marginal cost of labor, are affected by the fact that firms invest in R&D to reduce 
their marginal cost of capital. 
  20 
We show that when a firm relocates it invests more in R&D than when it remains in the 
home country. When a firm moves to a country where wage costs are lower, its market 
share and profits increase, which permits it to invest more in R&D and gain additional 
market share at the expense of its rival. Therefore, the former (latter) firm makes the higher 
(lower) investment in R&D. Given that the marginal cost of capital depends on investment 
in R&D by firms, when a firm relocates both its marginal cost of labor and its marginal 
cost of capital are lower and, thus, its profit is higher.  
 
In order to analyze whether R&D investments affect firms’ relocation decisions, we 
consider as a benchmark the case in which firms do not invest in R&D. We obtain that the 
range of values of parameters for which at least one firm relocates is wider when firms 
invest in R&D than in the benchmark case. Therefore, investment in R&D by firms 
encourages relocation.  
 
It could be considered that when a firm relocates it seeks to reduce labour costs and does 
not invest in R&D. However, firms that remain in the home country invest in R&D to be able 
to compete with firms that have moved abroad. It can be shown that in that case the range of 
parameter values for which at least one firm relocates is narrower than in the benchmark 
case. Therefore, when firms invest in R&D independently of their location, the range of 
parameter values for which at least one firm relocates is wider than when firms do not invest 
in R&D in case of relocation. 
 
  As an extension, we have analyzed whether firms’ relocation is optimal from a social 
welfare point of view in the two cases considered. It can be shown that in both cases the 
number of firms that relocate is not lower than socially desirable. This is because firms 
take into account only their own profits while social welfare comprises the consumer and 





                                                 
14 The proof is available from the authors on request. 
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Proof of proposition 3 
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Comparing the profits obtained by the firms: πNR – πRR >0 if and only if F>F1, and πRN – 
πNN >0 if and only if F<F2, where F2 – F1 = (81 (a – c)
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Proof of proposition 4 
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Only firms that do not relocate invest in R&D 
 
  Neither firm relocates. In this case, as both firms remain in the home country they both 
invest in R&D. Thus, the same result as in Lemma 1 is obtained.  
 
W e  n o w  a s s u m e  t h a t  f i r m  j relocates while firm i remains in the home country. 
Therefore, only firm i invests in R&D. Thus, in the fourth stage of the game each firm 
chooses the output level that maximizes its profit, given by expression (5), where Fj=F, 
wj=0 and Fi=0. Solving this, the following is obtained: 
 
qi(wi(xi), xi)= Li(wi(xi), xi) = 3 / ) 2 2 ( i i x w c a β + − − ,  
qj(wi(xi), xi)=Lj(wi(xi), xi)= 3 / ) ( i i x w c a β − + − , i≠j; i,j=A,B. 
 
  23  In the third stage, the union of firm i chooses the wage that maximizes its utility 
function. Solving this, we obtain: wi(xi)= 4 / ) 2 ( i x c a β + − , i = A, B. In the second stage of 
the game, firms simultaneously choose the R&D investment that maximizes their profits. 
Solving this, we obtain: 
 
xNR
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Next we consider that both firms relocate. In this case, as xj=xi=0, the same result as in the 
benchmark case is obtained.  
 
  In the first stage of the game firms decide whether to relocate or not. Let F1N denote the 
value of parameter F such that πNR≥πRR if and only if F≥F1N, and F2N denote the value of 
parameter F such that πRN≥πNN if and only if F≤F2N, F2N>F1N, F1N = ((a – c)
2 (8β
2 – 27γ))/ (36 
(2β
2 – 9γ)) and F2N = ((a – c)
2 (50176β
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Figure 2. Illustration of Proposition 7 
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